# Actual Cryptography at the Age of Evolving Ecosystems

Moti Yung,

Google

## Talk Agenda

- Part I: Crypto as part of general engineering projects
- Part II: Adx

   Review
- Part III: Adx— Crypto solutions
- Part IV: Conclusions

## From Abstract to Actual Crypto


- Abstract: Cryptographers deal with models, nicely quantified "adversarial power," then definitions, constructions, proofs, complexity,....
- Applied: looks at systems context and either applies a model to a sub-problem (authenticated key exchange, fast software encryption) and uses implementable primitives...
- Applied security system: natural; creating building blocks/ systems/ protocols/ standards: EAS, RSA, TLS, SHA..
- Actual crypto eng.: deploy specialized or novel custom made crypto in general system within actual development and deployed systems.

## My Goals in this talk

- Actual crypto is different from abstract crypto since it is working in an actual systems context: development, maintenance, business.
- Try to reflect upon these questions:
  - How to take part in a global ecosystem dvelopment process (& its specialized crypto needs)?
  - How to make sure crypto extends and survives as the systems evolve?
  - The differences eastetics/ measures of achievement

## Actual Crypto does not live alone

- Security is often at odds with, e.g.:
  - System Function
  - Performance
  - Usability (the User factor)
- Crypto is best applied when the above conflicts do not apply (e.g., hidden from the end user), or when the security requirement dominates (absolutely or to a large degree) and crypto aid security. (→ There is incentive to use crypto...)
  - This is an industrial perspective which is not in the textbook on crypto



## The Economics of Development

- Computers and systems are design to "compute a task" not to "be secure," so we need to optimize the deployment of crypto; and this is an art (it may be formalized and cases have been analyzed: economics of secure systems: where the incentive lies?)
- →Security is a fundamental issue (needed/ hard),
   but of secondary importance (tolerated/ be cheap)
- → Security cannot be retrofitted, but it always is!!
   Since non-experts do not see a need....
- →Crypto/ security eng. has to be (positively) opportunistic!

## Examples: crypto missed


- Database: not encrypted since relational algebra is hard on encrypted data.... (crypto goes against functionality and against performance)
- Early "secure mail" hard to configure so users chose the "insecure mode" as a default
- All routers same password: scalability of maintenance comes first, neglecting "real" security
- IBM's SNA: password on the clear! Rely on physical security, when "network scaled across same branch" problem ignored!
- Protocol extended: security not reviewed!

### Thus: we see


- After attacks which reduce the system's availability to users, hurt performance and function, people will tend to invest more in security (incentives)
- Mission critical system: security is part of function
- The need for crypto may come from different sources, may be implicit in the spec, so need to look for where it applies first..(the path of least resistance). → Need to be involved early!...and think carefully:
  - What is possible under the constraints?
  - Where and how to use the opportunity in the overall product context? Identifying intial well recognized need is important!

# To Ad Exchange (ADX)

## Internet Ads: Sponsored Search



## Internet Ads: Display Ads



## Internet/ Mobile Ads: Display Ads

- Traditional Online publishers and advertisers work together:
  - Negotiate offline or via intermediate networks,
  - Use planning, static policy, pricing and ad serving systems
    - DoubleClick, Microsoft's aQuantive, AOL's ADTECH AG, WPP's 24/7 Real Media.
  - Efficiency, effectiveness of this bulky "brand advertiser" model?
- The Newest Proposal for display ad business:
  - Two-sided real-time marketplace for matching online publishers and ("direct response") advertisers.
  - Yahoo's RightMedia, Google's Ad Exchange, Microsoft's AdECN.
- It applies to web and mobile advertisements

## Exchange


- On one side there are publishers (web pages) that have space for putting ads
- On the other side there are Ad Networks (buyers) representing companies that want to advertize.
   There are a few hundreds of those
- Ads are "added" to web pages
- There are many "viewers" of pages at publishers: every one browsing (essentially). Thus, this is a very huge scale Internet wide application

## Advertizing

- Can be done by and via Ad networks directly (buying an ad)
- Can be done via the exchange/ mixed models

 Let us review the Adx whichs resides in Google Cloud

## AdX Model



### **Architecture:**

- Viewer: you!
- Publisher: www.cnn.com
- AdX: the exchange hosted in Google Infrastructure available globally
- Ads Agency: Ads producer for companies (Coca Cola ads to be inserted) and distributers
- Advertiser: Coca Cola.

#### **Evolution of AdX**

- Doubleclick: modify to an exchange...
- Paper design, one server, three....
- Now: billions of transactions/ day, global exchange...
- The ecosystem of display is changing: mobile, apps, and so on...

# To Security & Privacy

## Immediate security

- The first goal in security was systems orinted: secure the user interfaces/ web/ ads/ anti-malware...
- ...and then we thought to crypto-secure the bids when needed since others should not learn them (according to the contract)...
  - Where are the possible leaks?

Then, we reviewed business and design and looked at added needs where is security/ crypto/ related issues needed?

### AdX characteristics

#### • Speed:

 Everything has to be done FAST (cannot slow down the Internet !!!).

#### Volume/ Scale:

- For a few years AdX runs ~billions auctions /day with a few (~thousands) networks.
- High bandwidth requirement
- Evolution: design system for evolving "market place" & added requirements



## Interesting Issue: After the Auction

- "Viewer's page" redirected to Ad Network with "I frame for display" that has the winning price embedded in it (winning price macro) pull model
- Viewer gets the ad, winning price exposed to user (violates business agreement (contract) and practical engineering of exchange) → ??? "a problem"
  - Note it is not "on the wire" but at the browser!
- This is a call for action: an immediate issue needs solution, and an opportunity to introduce cryptography!

## Security & Performance & Cost Align

- Embedded price in the macro (I frame) at the user possession that is used to pull the ad (for optimization need to send the price)
- This macro is the only way for the agency to know the price (second price auction; communication piggybacked).
- Otherwise: Hard to connect the price in another way to the agency (even if can double the bandwidth to the agency).
- → Best way to send via the user the price (in fact, security is secondary to the need to employ the user as a channel). Thus: Security and Performance/ cost align together!!!!
- Gap between Business model (service agreement) and Engineering needs → crypto to the rescue!!

### Needed

- Secure delivery
- analyze what encryption can be used
   (performance, context dependencies, security needs)
- $\rightarrow$  key management support

## Crypto Designer Goals

- Have a general encryption utility for current and FUTURE security needs. Cannot utilize standard solutions (SSL...)— be opportunistic!
- Separate <u>key management</u>: generation, distribution, rotation (which can <u>exploit existing components</u>) and customized on-line operations.
- Provide a solution for <u>secrecy and integrity</u>.
- Volume implies: many times over the same cleartext values (same price again and again). Need to retain (semantic) security nevertheless → special security needs

## Crypto Designer Goals cont.

 Stay in touch with engineering team....since needs will surely come, and the tools/ hooks are already in the system!

## Key management

- Auctioneer (Adx) and Ad Agency will exchange keys externally
  - Use out of band methods...
  - Or: use TLS/SSL relies on public key technology and on key exchange protocol (Signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange)
  - Typical solution: use the exchanged key. Can employ TLS w/ both sides having a public-key (server side and client side keys)
  - Result: both parties share a key for symmetric key use

## Side remark: The guts of TLS/SSL

- $A \rightarrow B$ : g^A signed by public key of A
- $B \rightarrow A$ : g^B signed by public key of B
- (g^A)^B= (g^B)^A= g^(A\*B) is joint key from which to derive the key.

- This is just standard protocol but 1000 agencies and a single auctioneer can do it at no problem! Offline...
- Industry you exploit existing solutions

## Security in Operation

- The encrypted price goes via the user browser to the agency, user can learn &modify!
- Need to make sure the encryption is valid (unless user erases/spoils the encryption, in which case the agency knows not to take it into account > need to detect manipulations).
- The encryption has to be authenticated as original

## **Authenticated Encryption**

- Combines Encryption and Authentication of the Encryption
  - Privacy: provides good hiding of the message
  - Authenticity: assures receiver that it comes from the original party
  - any attempt to forge will fail with very high probability
- Around 2000 it began to be an area of research

## **Authenticated Encryption**

- Preneel van Oorschut: pointed at the primitive and claimed that MAC = Hash with a key (private key signature), and good encryption will solve it; asked if there is "one pass method."
- Katz-Y. FSE 2000: first answer YES (under the name "unforgeable encryption"
- An-Bellare-Rogaway, Bellare-Rogaway, Bellare-Nemprepre, Krawczyk,...

## Types of AE

- Krawczyk analyzed Paradigms for separable AE
  - Encrypt-then-MAC: C=E(k1,M), H=MAC(k2,C) and send both
  - MAC-then-Encrypt: H=MAC(k2,M), C=E(k1, M||H) and send C
  - Encrypt-and-MAC: C=E(k1,M), H=MAC(k2,M)
- All are possible specifically some are generically good (any Mac and any encryption will do)
- Fast solutions one-pass (Rogaway, Jutla, Gligor....etc.)...
- NIST standards....

## Encryption via the user: solution

- Use Authenticated Encryption: with Encryption field and an Authentication field. Encrypt and MAC (parallel on server side) checking sequential.
- Use Pseudorandom Function based encryption:
  - Each display has a large enough "unique context" =
     seed; No need to extract real randomness (costly);
  - Derive from the seed a random pad;
  - use pad to exor with messages.
  - For more usage (forward looking design): enhance seed with action control in deriving the pad for cryptographic separation/ various length solution

## Encryption- in Adx context

- There is a unique tag, and the shared key is a seed of a Pseudorandom function F.
- Since it is unique per auction, every pseudorandom application gives fresh (pseudo)randomness, so we have strong security called: "Semantic Security" (cannot understand the content!)
- C= [F(k1,tag, action) exor M],
- H= MAC(k2,M)

## Advantages

- Fast, does not slow operation!
- Semantic security (due to unique display context tag)
- Flexible utility: F is variable size fields from small to large (for various extensions); authentication only/ encryption only modes can be used.
- Minimal added function (reuse existing/ standardized components whenever possible and research the core new components).
- For security 

  The system has crypto engine built in which can be used for other purposes!!!! Can be used to encrypt initial bids if so desired... etc.

## Summary for Adx Security

- The system works in this large scale of billions of transactions being encrypted per day (performance tested extensively!!)
- Helped engineering and business!
- The encryptor is essentially: a multi-use, different field size adaptable, enc+auth system.

(There are other security/crypto/ privacy components)

## Crypto Designer Goals Achieved

- General utility for privacy and/or integrity for online operation
- Out of band/ SSL/TLS/ etc. in use for key management

- in ADX/ display ads engineering group: security/ crypto awareness was raised: crypto can solve business issues! Can help engineering!
- Crypto is a friend not a foe!

## Indeed.. Extensions came..

- Moving to mobile: need to encrypt certain info of mobile user/ device properties, from Adx to the agencies!
- Encryptor easily extended in no time....

Next: two more contributions:

## Privacy and data Liberation

- Adx notifies agencies all info it collects on them
- Adx hides the cookie of users by encrypting them with agency specific keys that Adx keep to itself (the agency does not know the key)
  - This prevents agencies from correlating and finding a common user via the "google cookie"
  - This is a "user privacy issue" solved via encryption
  - If two agencies merge business wise: matching of cookies can be done by Adx!

## Verifiability

 Ability to verify correctness of auctions was designed to be very fast (built upon encrypted globally available bidding). Not implemented but disclosed as a possibility to partners.

## Summary

- The AdX system has been challenging
- Scale and Speed constraints
  - Security: "Extreme" yet complete Crypto
  - Privacy challenges
  - Only as much as needed
- It posed, both, engineering and research challenges (since 2008):
  - Initial security and privacy solutions have been deployed; while raising the bar for future issues!
  - Future issues became present issues!



#### Crypto in Engineering- general conclusions

- There is no fixed recipe for it, just general principles; "results" much less structured than in crypto papers, very few people understand the challenges (rare deployments in general), and getting it right is challenging and satisfying.
- Required the right interpretation of the theory
- Attack models and risk management apply, incentives for adoption (i.e., business issues related to the recent area "economics of security systems") and liabilities (i.e., legal issues) apply as well.
- Secure components still matter but should be mixed with "added value security" design (the economics behind what the business is investing in).

## Differences: theory vs. practice

- Robust Design: Proximity to the system: Requires close interactions w/ engineers, business leaders
- The more "actual solution" is viewed as reducing headaches (enabler), the more credibility and potential future influence.
- Tchnical clavoyance always helps (is part of the achievement, technical beauty): systems evolve, need to design crypto that is extendible, while current op ongoing.... (true to cloud ecosystems).
- Practice has to be based on solid theory &more..

## Thanks!